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HUMAN VALUES AND RELOCATION ASSISTANCE: AT 
THE CROSSROADS 
Stephen Goldstein * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The term "environment" means a great deal more than merely 
the quality of our air, the amount of chemical pollution in our wa-
ters and the condition of our oceans, mountains, trees and streams. 
The environment encompasses all of the factors that can affect the 
quality of our life. I The physical and social conditions of our urban 
centers and their effect upon the inhabitants of these cities are 
significant factors in an examination of our urban environment. Few 
would deny that overcrowding, squalor, crime and substandard 
housing are adverse human environmental factors. Furthermore, 
most would agree that our dwelling place is the most basic and 
important factor affecting our quality of life. 
Over the years, various federal agencies have been responsible for 
requiring large numbers of low and moderate income city dwellers 
to vacate their homes and neighborhoods. 2 The displacement has 
been necessary to carry out federally funded renewal projects in the 
inner cities in an effort to eliminate the spread of urban blight. 3 The 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
I Jones v. HUD, 390 F. Supp. 579, 591 (E.D. La. 1974). See, e.g., Silva v. Romney, 473 
F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973). 
2 Comment, The Uniform Relocation Act: A Viable Solution to the Plight of the Displaced, 
25 CATH. U. L. REV. 552 (1976). 
3 Senator Edmund D. Muskie (D. Maine), the Senate sponsor of Sl, The Uniform Reloca-
tion Assistance and Land Acquisition Policies Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-55 (1976) stated 
on the day of the Senate's passage of the Act: 
There are more than 50 Federal programs which result in the condemning of land and 
quite literally, the bulldozing of hundreds of thousands of people from their homes and 
businesses annually. Many of these people are low-income families. Many are the elderly; 
they are small farmers and small businessmen. In most cases their entire lives and eco-
nomic and social well-being have centered around the property or neighborhoods which 
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impact of forced relocation and the resultant costs to those dis-
placed should be examined by anyone concerned with the urban 
environment. 
Today such large scale urban renewal projects are relatively rare 
in the inner cities of America. In their place, however, the federal 
government has undertaken programs designed to encourage 
participation of the private sector in the continuing effort to provide 
low- and moderate-income housing.4 The basic structure of these 
programs is for the government, through the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), to insure the mortgages of private 
developers in the low-income market.5 
As with any program carried out on a nationwide scale, the mort-
gage insurance program has had its share of successes and failures. 6 
The failures seem to follow a basic pattern: initially the project's 
sponsors or owners find themselves in financial difficulty and de-
fault on the mortgage. After paying the mortgage insurance pro-
ceeds to the mortgagor, HUD obtains the title to the property at a 
foreclosure sale and, following mandatory studies, decides upon the 
final disposition of the project. At this point the tenants who reside 
in such housing projects usually are evicted so that HUD can demo-
lish the building and sell the land.7 Thus, the relocation problems 
previously associated with massive urban renewal projects have also 
been endemic to the newer efforts in urban revitalization. 
At the end of fiscal 1975, HUD held title to 67,875 single family 
units and 38,665 multi-family units acquired through such reposses-
sion of federally financed private homes and subsidized housing 
projects.s An increasing default rate in the mortgage insurance pro-
gram has made the federal government one of the largest owners of 
inner city properties.8 These foreclosures and subsequent disposi-
are being uprooted. 
115 CONGo REC. 31533-34 (1969). Senator Muskie further stated that various government 
estimates placed the displacement figure over the ten-year period forthcoming to be in excess 
of orie million people; 180,000 businesses and 40,000 farms. Id. 
• See generally National Housing Act §§ 202,203, 220, 221, 235, 236, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1706-
1713 (1976). 
• Id. 
• See generally Alexander V. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 
(1979); Cole V. Harris, 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
7Id. 
• Comment, The Uniform Relocation Act: A Viable Solution to the Plight of the Dis-
placed, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 552, 552 n.1 (1976). 
• HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, DEFAULTS ON FHA INSURED HOME MORTGAGES 
1979] RELOCATION ASSISTANCE 465 
tions of property by HUDIO have led to the population displacement 
with which this article is concerned. 
While the government is statutorily obligated to offer relocation 
assistance for those displaced by traditional urban renewal pro-
jects,l1 it has balked at providing aid to persons displaced by mort-
gage foreclosures.1 2 The issue presented is whether the tenants 
evicted in these mortgage foreclosures are entitled to federal reloca-
tion assistance as provided for in the Uniform Relocation Assistance 
and Real Property Acquisition Act of 1970 (URA).13 HUD contends 
that the tenants displaced in the acquisition and disposition of gov-
ernment insured buildings or projects do not fit the statutory defini-
tions14 set forth in URA, and, consequently, that such persons are 
not entitled to relocation benefits under the Act. 15 Three circuits 
have agreed with HUD in its assertion that URA does not protect 
displaced tenants who fall into this category.16 However, the District 
of Columbia Circuit has held to the contrary and awarded tenants 
evicted from HUD-insured apartments full benefits under URA.17 
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the conflict 
among the circuits. 
The Supreme Court, for purposes of argument, consolidated the 
two appellate cases of Alexander v. HUDIS and Cole v. Harris. lu 
Final resolution of the conflict rested upon whether the tenants in 
each of these cases can be characterized as "displaced person," 
within URA. In order to reach a determination on this issue the 
Court had to examine the most basic and important element of the 
- DETROIT, MICHIGAN, H.R. REP. No. 92-1152, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-7 (1972). 
10 HUD, pursuant to statutory authority found in sections 202, 203, 220, 221, 235, 236 of 
the National Housing Act 12 U.S.C. §§ 1706-1713 (1976), insures mortgages for various types 
of housing. When the owner defaults on the mortgage HUD may foreclose and acquire title 
to the property which invariably results in the tenants being evicted so that HUD can dispose 
of the property either by sale at auction or by demolition. 
1\ 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-55 (1976). 
12 See Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), aiI'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979); Cole 
v. HaITis, 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
I3 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-55 (1976). 
" URA § 101(6), 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976). 
15 See Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), aiI'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979); Cole 
v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
" Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), aiI'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979); Harris 
v. Lynn, 555 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, sub nom. Harris v. Harris, 434 U.S. 927 
(1977); Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974). 
17 Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590 .(D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
18 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), aiI'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
" 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
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statutory definition. The foreclosure acquisition and subsequent 
disposition by HUD had to be characterized as being for "a pro-
gram or project undertaken by a federal agency"20 before benefits 
become available. On April 17, 1979 a unanimous Court found that 
such mortgage default acquisitions are not "for" a federal program 
within the meaning of URA. Therefore, the evicted tenants did not 
qualify as "displaced persons" within the purview of the Act and 
were denied relocation assistance benefits. 21 The Court's decision 
was based primarily on a limited and severely restricted analysis of 
the legislative history. The plain and commonly understood mean-
ings of words, the broad policy statements of the Act's sponsors and 
supporters and the very basic underlying human values behind relo-
cation assistance were ignored. In their place the Court referred only 
to a very narrow and specific portion of the voluminous legislative 
history to support the decision. The impact of the Court's reluctance 
to engage in a broader approach to statutory interpretation will be 
keenly felt by the many in our society whom the Court has histori-
cally protected - the poor, the elderly and the minorities. 
In order to fully understand the scope of the problem and the 
issues presented to the Court, one must closely examine a number 
of sources. A synopsis of the relevant provisions of URA provide the 
reader with an overview of the financial benefits available for dis-
placed persons under the Act. An examination of the legislative 
history will aid in the somewhat subjective determination of con-
gressional intent as well as in clarifying the stated purposes and 
policy of the Act. A discussion of the early administrative and judi-
cial interpretations of the Act will provide a suitable background for 
an analysis of contemporary problems arising under URA. Finally, 
in addition to the actual Supreme Court decision this article will 
examine alternatives that were available to the Court when it ana-
lyzed the "displaced persons" provision of URA, and will conclude, 
contrary to the Court's opinion, that persons displaced by mortgage 
foreclosures are entitled to benefits under the Act. 
II. THE UNIFORM RELOCATION ASSISTANCE AND REAL PROPERTY 
ACQUISITION ACT OF 1970 
A. Provisions of URA: A Synopsis 
In 1970, URA repealed the patchwork of statutory relocation as-
20 URA § 101(6), 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976). 
21 Alexander v. HUD, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979); Cole v. Harris, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
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sistance programs scattered throughout the U.S. Code.22 The ration-
ale for providing any relocation assistance for persons displaced as 
a result of federal and federally assisted programs is that such per-
sons should not suffer disproportionate injury as a result of pro-
grams designed for the benefit of the public as a whole. 23 Federal or 
federally funded programs are intended to help eliminate urban 
blight, and the benefit to the general public is obvious. Such bene-
fits, however, should not be obtained at a disproportionate cost to 
the individual displacee. 
URA24 establishes a uniform system of relocation assIstance pay-
ments for displaced persons. "Displaced persons" are defined in 
Section 101(6) of the Act as any person who must move from real 
property as a result of the acquisition of such real property, or as 
the result of a written order of the acquiring agency to vacate the 
property, for a program or project undertaken by a federal agency.20 
A great many of the legal controversies surrounding URA have ari-
sen from the interpretation of the Section 101(6) eligibility require-
ments. 28 Although this provision has enabled many persons to re-
ceive relocation benefits, a substantial number have been excluded 
from the Act's coverage through the narrow interpretation afforded 
the provision by HUn and the federal judiciary. 27 
Those persons found eligible for assistance are entitled to finan-
cial compensation in the form of reimbursements for actual and 
reasonable moving expenses. 28 In lieu of this reimbursement, a dis-
placee may receive a moving expense allowance of up to $300, along 
with an additional $200 dislocation allowance. 29 
22 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of Ui70, Pub. 
L. No. 91-646, § 220(a), 84 Stat. 1894 (1970), repealing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1231-34 (1970), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2473(b)(14) (1970), 10 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970), 49 U.S.C. § 1606(b)(1970), 42 U.S.C. § 1465 
(1970),42 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(iii)(8)(1970), 42 U.S.C. § 3074 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3307(b), (cl 
(1970), 23 U.S.C. §§ 501-511 (1970). 
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976). 
24 The Act is divided into three major sections. Title I, id. §§ 4601-03 includes general 
provisions and definitions; Title II, id. §§ 4621-38 deals with Uniform Relocation Assistance; 
and Title III, id. §§ 4651-55 relates to a Uniform Real Property Acquisition Policy. For 
purposes of the analysis in this article we will be concerned only with Titles I and II. Title 
III does not relate to the questions presently at issue. 
25 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(1976). 
" [d. 
27 See Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), aft'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979); Cole 
v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979); Caramico v. HUD, 
509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(1976). 
" [d. § 4622(b). 
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There are also replacement housing benefits available to both 
tenants and owners. A tenant who has occupied the acquired prem-
ises for a period of a least ninety days prior to the initiation of 
negotiations for acquisition is additionally entitled to upwards of 
$2,000, to cover the down payment and other expenses incidental to 
the purchase of a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling.30 If such a 
tenant is willing to personally match an amount in excess of $2,000, 
the government will extend the maximum to $4,000.31 Should the 
tenant choose not to purchase a home, there is a maximum of $4,000 
available over a four year period to cover the difference between the 
rental price of the unit from which the tenant was displaced and the 
rental price of a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling. 32 
Any homeowner who is displaced and who has acquired the prop-
erty at least 180 days prior to the initiation of negotiations for HUn 
acquisition is entitled to a sum equal to the difference between the 
compensation price of the property and a comparable replacement 
dwelling. 33 Such a displaced owner is also entitled to compensation 
for the increased interest costs incurred in financing the new pur-
chase, as well as certain closing costS.34 The total of all benefits 
cannot exceed $15,000 to anyone person.35 
In addition, for both displaced owners and tenants there are guar-
antees of relocation assistance advisory services. 36 Should a suffi-
cient supply of replacement housing to accommodate the displacees 
be lacking, the federal agency must either arrange for the construc-
tion or purchase of such replacement housing with federal funds, or 
abandon the relocation plan.37 
The financial benefits available seem minimal. The harsh reality 
of the situation becomes clear when one considers that the majority 
of people displaced by government action are the disadvantaged of 
our society who can least afford any disruption. The financial and 
emotional impact of a forced move on low-income persons and fami-
lies can be enormous. Compounding the problem is a lack of stan-
dard housing at prices or rents that low-or moderate-income fami-
3. [d. § 4624. 
31 [d. § 4624(2). 
32 [d. § 4624(1). 
33 [d. § 4623. 
34 [d. 
35 [d. § 4623(a)(1). 
36 [d. § 4625. 
37 [d. § 4626. 
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lies can afford.38 The difficulty of this situation is felt even more 
acutely by the elderly, large families and non-white displacees.:19 
However, despite the fact that the finanical benefits do not seem 
great, they do somewhat reduce the burden of moving. 
In light of the judicial and administrative interpretations to date 
it appears that the task of providing an equitable remedy to the 
plight of these displaced persons was not completed by the enact-
ment of URA.40 Certainly with URA came a welcome pattern of 
uniformity regarding federal relocation benefits.41 However, it is also 
true that these uniform benefits have been denied to' a large and 
growing number of economically disadvantaged inner city residents 
displaced from their homes and communities.42 This denial of bene-
fits is the result of a narrow interpretation given to the Act's eligibil-
ity provisions by the responsible government agencies,43 an interpre-
tation which is generally supported by the federal courts,44 and 
which has now been approved by the Supreme Court.45 
The narrow interpretation of URA's eligibility requirements by 
both HUD and the federal courts does not seem to have any founda-
tion within the Act itself. There is no limiting language on the face 
of the statute nor any indication that agencies are to unilaterally 
limit the reach of the Act. Furthermore, an examination of the 
legislative history will show that such a narrow interpretation ac-
tually contravenes congressional intent to provide a broad remedial 
statute. 
B. Legislative History, Policy and Responses to Administrative 
Interpretation 
As a basic principle, statutory interpretation begins with the lan-
guage of the act itself. Such language should be read as it is com-
3. HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, THE STUDY OF COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR PER-
SONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY ACQUIsmON IN FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS, 
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 105-12 (1964) [hereinafter cited as STUDY OF COMPENSATION] . 
.. [d . 
•• See Moorer v. HUD, 561 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1977); Dawson v. HUD, 428 F.Supp. 328 
(N.D. Ga. 1976); Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974). 
II 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976) . 
.. See Alexander v. HUD, 565 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979); Cole 
v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). See also Caramico 
v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974). 
43 [d . 
.. [d . 
.. Alexander v. HUD, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
470 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS lVol. 7:463 
monly understood, and when the interpretation is neither absurd on 
its face nor inconsistent with the statute's evident purpose, and does 
not lead to absurd or futile results, the court's search is ended.46 The 
serious conflict over eligibility requirements in Section 101(6) of 
URA cannot be resolved in such a simple manner. The language 
pertaining to "a program or project undertaken by a Federal 
agency"47 is not so clear and unambiguous as to permit a proper 
determination without resorting to other sources. Courts have tradi-
tionally sought guidance from a statute's legislative history when 
faced with problems of ambiguous construction,48 and here an inde-
pendent examination of the legislative history of URA is likewise 
useful. 
1. Policy Considerations Behind the Passage of URA 
The Housing Act of 1954 was the first congressional effort to 
confront the hardships faced by displaced persons, and provided 
financial assistance for building low-cost replacement housing. 49 
The scope of congressional concern at this very early stage in the 
development of remedial legislation is evident. The Senate Report 
accompanying the Housing Act of 1954 stated: 
Eligible displaced families would include families which are required to 
move because of any form of governmental action, such as land acquisi-
tion by a public body, closing or vacating of dwellings by public officials, 
or the eviction of families from public housing because of their income.,n 
Following the Housing Act of 1954, Congress continued to pass legis-
lation designed to provide a measure of relief to people displaced by 
govern men tal actions. 51 
In the 1960's there were two major governmental programs pro-
viding relocation assistance benefits to displacees. These two pro-
grams were specifically designed to aid those persons affected by the 
two traditional causes of government-initiated displacement: the 
" United States v. American Trucking Assn's., :HO U.S. 534, 543 (1940). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 4621(6)(1976). 
48 See, e.g., Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943); United States v. 
American Trucking Assn's., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). 
" 12 U.S.C. § 1715(L) (1976). 
50 S. REP. No. 1472, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954J U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
2748. 
51 See National Housing Act of 1956 § 305, Pub. L. No. 1020, 70 Stat. 1091, 1100 (1956); 
Pub. L. No. 85-433, 72 Stat. 152 (1958). 
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construction of new federal highways through urban areas,52 and 
urban renewal housing projects carried out under the auspices of 
HUD.53 In addition, there were also a number of less significant 
programs administered by various government agencies which un-
dertook projects that resulted in population displacement.54 For ex-
ample, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized to reimburse 
owners and tenants of land acquired for the construction, mainte-
nance or operation of developments under his jurisdiction,55 and the 
Secretary of Defense was authorized to provide reimbursement to 
landowners and tenants for expenses incuned in moving from real 
property acquired for a public works project under his auspices.58 
The Secretary of Transportation was not permitted to fund any 
project under the Urban Mass Transportation Act unless an ade-
quate relocation program was made available. 57 
Each of these programs had its own eligibility requirements as 
well as its own system of compensation. 58 These disparate benefit 
provisions resulted in a haphazard and inconsistent pattern in the 
availability of relocation assistance. Persons displaced by one gov-
ernment project could conceivably receive less aid than similarly 
situated persons who were displaced by a different agency. 59 This 
inequality of treatment was the stimulus behind the passage of 
URA.80 
In 1961, Congress decided to evaluate its piecemeal approach to 
the plight of displaced persons.81 A congressional subcommittee 
report determined that the lack of uniformity within the govern-
ment programs was detrimental and that a uniform approach to the 
problem was needed.82 As the report stated: 
The amount of disruption caused by Federal and federally assisted pro-
grams is astoundingly large. The accelerated pace of Government activ-
52 See Highway Relocation Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1724 (1970) . 
.. See 42 U.S.C. § 1455(h)(1976). 
54 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1231-34 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2473 (1976),10 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976), 
49 U.S.C. § 1606(b) (1970),42 U.S.C. § 1465 (1976). URA repealed the provisions in 10 U.S.C. 
§ 2680 (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 1465 (1976) . 
• 5 43 U.S.C. § 1231 (1970) (repealed 1971). 
51 10 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976) (repealed 1970). 
57 49 U.S.C. § 1606 (1970) . 
.. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2473 (1970), 49 U.S.C. § 1606 (1970), 10 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970),43 
U.S.C. §§ 1231-34 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 1465 (1970). 
5f [d . 
.. See 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976). 
II STUDY OF COMPENSATION, supra note 38. 
I. [d. at 105-12. 
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ity, . make[s] any lessening of current activity in the foreseeable 
future highly unlikely. 
* * * 
Concern for the effects of displacement by Government action is consis-
tent with the policy of the Nation to assure economic and social oppor-
tunity for every citizen. Economic costs of displacement should be borne 
by the public on a uniform basis in all programs .... 63 
The first uniform bills, introduced in 1965, addressed the incon-
sistent treatment of displaced persons and the inadequate assis-
tance provided. I. Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, in introducing 
S.l (which would become URA), stated the concerns of all those who 
supported the bill: 
[A] major item of unfinished business ... is the passage of legislation 
assuring consistent and fair treatment of those who are uprooted from 
their homes and places of business by projects carried out by the Federal 
Government. . . . 
* * * 
When called upon to make this adjustment in their personal lives for 
the public good, such persons must be able to tum to the responsible 
agency ... and be assured of the help they need to reestablish them-
selves in homes no less satisfactory than those they were forced to 
leave.'s 
As each new problem was presented and examined, sections of the 
original bill were expanded to assure that the congressional intent 
would be carried out.88 The concern for persons displaced by projects 
designed to benefit the public as a whole was repeatedly expressed 
during deliberations over URA.87 The House Report stated: 
[This legislation] ... provides a humanitarian program of reloca-
tion payments, advisory assistance, assurance that comparable, decent, 
safe, and sanitary replacement housing will be available for displaced 
persons prior to displacement . . . [a]nd, perhaps most important of' 
all, it gets to the heart of the dislocation problem by providing the 
.. Id . 
•• See S.1201, S.1681, H.R. 10212 and H.R. 11869, all introduced in 1965 . 
•• 115 CONGo REc. 772 (1969) (emphasis added) . 
.. Senator Baker's concern for displacement of outdoor advertising was covered in 42 
U.S.C. § 4601(7)(d)(1976); Senator Tyding's concern for "Mom and Pop" stores was covered 
in 42 U.S.C. § 4622 (c)(1976); Representative Koch's concern for a special New York City 
situation is covered in the uncodified Section 219 (84 Stat. 1894, 1903). See Brief for Petition-
ers at 13, Alexander V. HUD, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
17 See 115 CONGo REc. 31534 (1966) (remarks by Sen. Tydings); 116 CONGo REc. 42138 (1970) 
(remarks by Sen. Percy); 116 CONGo REc. 40167 (1970) (remarks by Rep. Jacobs). 
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means for positive action to increase the available housing supply for 
displaced low and moderate income families and individuals.8K 
Senator Percy best summarized the intention of Congress when he 
said: 
In public hearings the unfair treatment, inadequate payment, insuffi-
cient relocation assistance provided to those displaced is being brought 
out. Too often the complaints come from the very people the projects 
were designed to help, the poor and the elderly living in the inner city. 
They experience most severely the economic and personal effects of 
relocation from familiar surroundings. If there are forgotten Americans, 
surely these people seem to qualify. No public project should result in 
financial loss or hardship to the people it displaces. Congress did not 
intend to place undue burdens on those forced to relocate . . . . 
We must insure that anyone who loses property or a home as a result 
of a public project receives fair compensation under a uniform set of 
procedures . . . . 88 
The legislative history of URA clearly establishes an overriding 
congressional interest in providing uniform and equitable treat-
ment for all persons displaced by federal action. From the very 
beginning, however, HUn attempted to limit its responsibilities 
through a series of narrow and tortured administrative interpreta-
tions of the Act.70 In an early 1972 case71 HUn refused to give reloca-
tion assistance to families evicted because of rehabilitation work 
being completed under the auspices of a private developer pursuant 
to a federally sponsored program. Hun contended that although the 
construction costs were federally financed, URA did not cover pro-
jects undertaken by a private developer.72 
.. H.R. REp. No. 91-1656, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970J U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 5850, 5852 . 
• t Hearings on S.l Before The Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 54-55 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. 
7' Letter from Representative John A. Blatnik, Chairman, Committee on the Public Works 
to George W. Romney, Secretary, HUD, June 7, 1972, as cited in Comment, The Uniform 
Relocation Act: A Viable Solution to the Plight of the Displaced, 25 CATH. U. L. REv. 552, 
552 n.62 (1976). 
71 Manning V. Romney, Civil No. 72-1342 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 13, 1972), as cited in Comment, 
The Uniform Relocation Act: A Viable Solution to the Plight of the Displaced, 25 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 562, 564 n.61 (1976). 
72 [d. The Court did not reach a determination as to whether the Act applies when private 
parties undertake such a program and acquire property since the tenants in these cases 
claimed that a federal program caused the displacement. Nor was there any determination 
as to whether URA would apply when a state or local agency acquires property in a covered 
program or project. 
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As one would imagine, such an interpretation by HUD so soon 
after the Act's enactment drew criticism from the promulgators of 
the Act who had intended a broader application. Representative 
John Blatnik, one of the original sponsors, called HUD's position 
"callous and incomprehensible" and further stated, "[i]n drafting 
the legislation all of us were concerned that its purpose would not 
be thwarted by narrow, tortured, legalistic, administrative interpre-
tations. "73 
In order to alleviate the problems caused by what Senator How-
ard Baker called "the almost uncanny willingness and ability of 
government units to find ways around the mandate of the Uniform 
Act, "74 an amendment to URA was proposed.75 In support of this 
amendment Senator Baker argued that "wherever a federal dollar 
reaches, there lie the rights and benefits guaranteed by the Act. "78 
The proposed amendment, designed to make clear congressional 
intent that any person displaced by any undertaking involving the 
federal government would be due benefits, passed each house but 
due to other disagreements never went to conference. No further 
action was taken before the 92d Congress adjourned. 
Considering the large and growing number of repossessions result-
ing from failures in its own mortgage insurance programs,77 HUD's 
narrow interpretation of the statute is not surprising. A broader 
interpretation would require HUD to provide substantial money 
payments to many persons now denied benefits. Regardless of this 
potentially great financial impact on HUD, the posture taken to-
wards those displaced by the failure of various revitalization plans 
raises serious questions of compliance with congressional intent. 
2. History of the Specific Language of URA 
Any examination of legislative history can lead to conflicting con-
clusions. The variety of approaches and the relative importance 
73 Letter from Representative John A. Blatnik, Chairman, Committee on Public Works to 
George W. Romney, Secretary, HUD, June 7, 1972, as cited in Comment, The Uniform 
Relocation Act: A Viable Solution to the Plight of the Displaced, 25 CATH. U. L. REv. 552, 
562 n.62 (1976). 
" 118 CONGo REc. 12343 (1972). 
" Proposed Amendment to the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisi-
tions Act of 1970: Hearing on S1819 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the 
House Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1972). 
7. 118 CONGo REc. 12343 (1972). 
77 See Comment, The Uniform Relocation Act: A Viable Solution to the Plight of the 
Displaced, 25 CATH. U. L. REv. 552, 552 n.1 (1976). 
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accorded to broad principles of intent as opposed to isolated and 
seemingly more specific indications of intent, are factors that can 
only add to these potential conflicts. URA's legislative history has 
not proven to be immune from these inherent problems of approach. 
The Supreme Court's analysis of the legislative history of URA led 
to its conclusion that the intended scope of the assistance program 
was closer to the government's narrow application position than the 
broader position espoused by the tenants. However, the Court did 
recognize that the "statutory language is susceptible of either con-
struction."78 Seemingly, one can therefore legitimately argue that 
the question before the Court lent itself to a broad subjective deter-
mination rather than a technical and specific approach. 
The analysis engaged in by the Court focused entirely upon the 
historical evolution of the language contained in the Section 201 
Declaration of Policy78 and the history of the specific statutory defi-
nition of "displaced person." There was no reference to the broader, 
more general and subjective policy and intent underlying relocation 
assistance as indicated in the earlier portion of this section. 
In order to determine the purpose of URA, the Court turned to 
the language of a proposed 1964 "Fair Compensation Act," finding 
it to be the basis for most of the provisions ultimately codified in 
URA.80 The declared purpose of this early proposal was to afford 
"persons affected by the acquisition of real property in federal and 
federally assisted programs . . . fair and equitable treatment on a 
basis as nearly uniform as practicable. "81 The Court felt that this 
early and unadopted provision unambiguously reflected a limited 
congressional purpose in the revision of relocation assistance legis-
lation. The initial intent was only to provide better and more uni-
form assistance to those people whose property was acquired for 
federal purposes. The Court found no intention to extend assistance 
beyond this limited group to all persons somehow displaced by gov-
ernmental programs.82 As further evidence of this congressional pol-
icy of providing benefits to displacements caused only by acquisi-
tions of property for a government program or project, the Court 
stated that this basic objective remained unchanged by any specific 
language as Congress considered a number of bills derived from the 
7. 47 U.S.L.W. 4369, 4372 (1979). 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976). 
8. 47 U.S.L.W. 4369, 4373 (1979). 
81 STUDY OF COMPENSATION, supra note 38, at 147 . 
.. 47 U.S.L.W. 4369, 4372 (1979). 
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early proposal. 83 The Court directed minimal attention to the dele-
tion by the House of Representatives of the references to 
"acquisitions of real property" in the adopted version of Section 201 
which now refers to "persons displaced as a result of federal and 
federally assisted programs. "84 According to the Court the sugges-
tion that all such persons are the intended beneficiaries of the Act 
as adopted is clearly inconsistent with prior versions of the Section, 
all of which specifically relate to displacement caused by acquisi-
tion.85 The Court then turned its attention to prior versions of the 
Section 101(6)88 definition of displaced persons. An examination of 
the early provisions indicated to the Court that when Congress 
added the second part of the statutory definition,87 commonly 
known as the "written order clause," the intent was solely to deline-
ate more precisely the persons eligible for assistance.88 The Court 
maintains that the legislative history reveals no intent to extend 
relocation benefits beyond the context of a government acquisition. 
The clause is only to ensure that assistance is available for a distinct 
group who are directed to vacate because of a contemplated but 
uncompleted acquisition. 89 
The Court's examination of URA's legislative history ended at 
this point. No mention was made of the underlying human values 
and concerns that led to the passage of URA. There was no attempt 
to discern the broader implication of the Act, only the very detailed 
analysis of the language as it evolved from prior versions. However, 
when construing an act such as URA the humanitarian concerns as 
voiced by the promulgators of the Act should be kept foremost in 
mind. Congressional concern for the hardships experienced by all 
persons displaced through governmental action demands a less re-
strictive interpretation of the Act; one that is faithful to the overrid-
ing purpose Congress sought to achieve. In order to more fully un-
derstand the Supreme Court's decision, it is now appropriate to 
examine how the federal courts have actually interpreted the eligi-
bility requirements of the Act in the past. 
83 [d . 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976). 
" 47 U.S.L.W. 4369, 4373 (1979) . 
.. 42 U.S.C, § 4601(6) (1976). 
87 See Section II C Early Judicial Interpretation of Eligibility, infra for a discussion of 
§ 101(6) . 
.. 47 U.S.L.W. 4369, 4374 (1979) . 
.. [d. 
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C. Early Judicial Interpretation of Eligibility 
With so much depending on the interpreted breadth of the eligi-
bility requirements in Section 101(6) of URA,90 it comes as no sur-
prise that this provision is the most litigated section of the Act. An 
examination of early cases shows that the question of eligibility has 
arisen in a variety of contexts and fact patterns throughout the years 
since the Act's passage in 1970. The courts have generally upheld 
HUD's narrow and strict construction of Section 101(6).91 The most 
recent context in which litigation concerning eligibUity require-
ments has arisen is where the federal government has (through 
HUD) acquired property by the foreclosure of defaulted mortgages 
insured under the National Housing Act. 92 The majority of these 
decisions have also tended to deny relocation benefits to those per-
sons displaced by HUD's acquisition by foreclosure. 
Courts have begun their inquiry as to whether evicted tenants are, 
in fact, "displaced persons" under URA by examining the language 
of Section 101(6) of the Act. The provision sets out two specific 
eligibility requirements. A "displaced person" is one who moves 
from real property either (1) as a result of the acquisition of real 
property, for a federal or federally assisted program, or (2) as the 
result of a written order of the acquiring agency to vacate the prop-
erty for a federal or federally assisted program.93 These two catego-
ries are disjunctive in that a person who falls within either will be 
entitled to relocation benefits under the Act. 94 
An examination of the cases decided under the statute indicates 
that the courts and the litigants have often termed the first branch 
of this dual definition as the "acquisition" clause95 while the second 
,. 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976). 
" See Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979); 
Harris v. Lynn, 555 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977); Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974). 
" 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1706c-I715L (1976). 
93 The Section reads in full: 
The term 'displaced person' means any person who, on or after January 2, 1971, moves 
from real property, or moves his personal property from real property, as a result of the 
acquisition of such real property, in whole or in part, or as the result of the written order 
of the acquiring agency to vacate real property, for a program or project undertaken by a 
Federal agency, or with Federal financial assistance; and solely for the purposes of sections 
4622(a) and (b) and 4625 of this title, as a result of the acquisition of or as the result of 
the written order of the acquiring agency to vacate other real property on which such 
person conducts a business or farm operation, for such program or project. 
42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976) . 
.. [d . 
.. See Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979); 
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branch has been termed the "written order" clause.96 The distinc-
tion does not seem to serve much purpose except to provide both the 
government and the tenants with an argument to distinguish ad-
verse decisions. Either litigant can argue that a specific case should 
not carry precedential weight since it was decided under the "other" 
branch of the definition. In reality, the cases address the same ques-
tions and are not fundamentally distinguishable. 97 The distinction 
tends to downplay the more critical issue of whether there exists a 
federal or federally assisted program or project, a necessary require-
ment under either branch of the definition. 
Unfortunately the language of the Act does not provide much 
guidance regarding this critical issue in that there is no definition 
of "program or project" within the Act's general provisions. Impor-
tantly, however, there is no indication within the Act that any par-
ticular program or project is to be excluded from the coverage. This 
lack of limitation, when examined together with the legislative his-
tory, is the primary indication favoring the broad concept that any 
acquisition of real property by a federal agency which causes people 
to be displaced from their homes should result in benefits being 
made available to those displaced. 9s However, until the case of Cole 
v. Harris99 the courts have not been willing to interpret the eligibility 
requirements so broadly. To the contrary, they have interpreted the 
language of the provision to strictly limit eligibility for the Act's 
benefits. 100 
One early lower court decision, Feliciano v. Romney,IOI inter-
preted Section 101(6) so as not to provide benefits for tenants dis-
placed during the period of time between initial approval by HUD 
of the proposed renewal project and the actual granting of funds. 
There the project's sponsors, with HUD's approval, evicted the ten-
ants prior to final government approval of the project. The court 
held that prior to the execution of the contract, the project could 
not be considered as "one undertaken by a federal agency" thereby 
Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974) . 
.. See Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979); 
Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1977), aiI'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
" See Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1977), aii'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
" See Brief of Petitioners at 18, Alexander v. HUD, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979) . 
.. Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
'00 See Alexander v . .HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), aiI'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369, (1979); 
Harris v. Lynn, 555 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977); Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974). 
'0' 363 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
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removing the displaced tenants from the protection of the Act. 102 
This early narrow interpretation of eligibility was subsequently 
extended to exclude payment of benefits to those displaced by the 
sale of property to a private developer. 103 In Jones v. HUD, low-
income tenants of a HUD subsidized housing project were evicted 
with HUD's approval so that the building could be demolished prior 
to sale of the land at auction. The court found that HUD's proposed 
sale of the land to a private developer was not for a "federal pro-
gram" within the contemplation of URA.104 
1. The Foreclosure Cases 
In the earliest case regarding displacement through a mortgage 
foreclosure, HUD continued its policy of strictly construing the eli-
gibility requirements of URA by refusing relocation payments to 
persons displaced as the result of repossessions. The Second Circuit 
in Caramico v. HUDI05 supported HUD's position by holding that 
mortgage insurance acquisitions were not programs covered by 
URA.loe The plaintiffs were low-income tenants of mortgaged prop-
erties insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), a sub-
division of HUD. Following default by the owner and subsequent 
foreclosure, the mortgagee evicted the tenants in order to recover on 
the mortgage insurance. 107 HUD maintained that its mortgage insur-
ance program and foreclosure provisions could not be considered an 
acquisition that would trigger the application of URA. The tenants 
reasoned that since HUD's requirement of vacant delivery was de-
signed to aid in the eventual disposition of the property by rehabili-
tation or some other manner, the mortgage insurance program was 
similar to an urban renewal program. As there was no question that 
those displaced by a federal urban renewal project were eligible for 
URA benefits, the tenants urged that those displaced by the insur-
ance program should likewise be eligible. 
The court stated that although there may well have been an ac-
quisition, the tenants failed to prove that the acquisition was "for 
102 [d. at 672. 
'03 390 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. La. 1974). 
, •• [d. at 583. 
, •• 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974). 
, •• [d. at 699. 
'07 Under FHA regulations for a mortgagor to recover the insurance proceeds the property 
must be tendered unoccupied to the FHA. 24 C.F.R. § 203.381 (1974). 
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a program or project undertaken by a federal agency .... "108 Ac-
cording to the Second Circuit, there is a crucial difference between 
mortgage insurance acquisitions and acquisitions under other pro-
grams covered by URA: 
[T]he Act contemplates normal government acquisitions, which are 
the result of conscious decisions to build a highway or housing project 
or hospital .... Default acquisitions by the FHA, however, embody 
no conscious governmental decision at all . . . . The only voluntary 
action taken by the government is the decision to require unoccupied 
delivery before making the insurance payment. The acquisition itself, 
however, is clearly involuntary and in response to the default .... 
[R]andom acquisitions by the FHA of defaulted property are not ac-
quisitions for a program or project undertaken by a federal agency.III!1 
The Eighth Circuit followed the strict construction line of reason-
ing in construing Section 101(6) in Harris u. Lynn. IIO That case 
involved a suit for benefits under URA by former tenants of a hous-
ing project constructed by a city housing authority. The project was 
financed with development funds from the then Public Housing 
Administration along with yearly contributions from the govern-
ment to retire the original loan. Title to the property remained at 
all times with the City Housing Authority. The worsening financial 
condition of the project proved to be a severe strain on the Housing 
Authority and adversely affected its ability to maintain other 
healthy projects. With the concurrence of HUD the Authority termi-
nated the leases of the remaining tenants and closed down the pro-
ject. The buildings were then demolished with funds provided by 
HUD.lII 
The Court of Appeals affirmed and adopted the District Court's 
finding ll2 that "[u]nder any realistic view ... the plaintiffs were 
not displaced 'as a result of the acquisition' of the property, for a 
program undertaken with federal financial assistance or by a federal 
agency. "113 The Appeals Court reasoned that the only acquisition 
with federal financial assistance had been the original acquisition 
by the City Housing Authority, and the plaintiffs were in no way 
10' Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694, 697 (2d Cir. 1974). 
10. Id. at 698-99. 
110 555 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 927 (1977). 
III Harris v. Lynn, 411 F. Supp. 692, 693-94 (E.D. Mo. 1976). 
112 Harris v. Lynn, 555 F.2d 1357, 1359 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 927 (1977). 
113 Harris v. Lynn, 411 F. Supp. 692, 694 (E.D. Mo. 1976). 
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displaced as a result of that acquisition. 114 Unlike the previous cases 
there was no need to reach the question of whether there existed a 
federal program or project. 
In light of the generous provisions of URAII5 and the legislative 
history of the Act,1I8 these early judicial decisions strictly construing 
the eligibility requirements seem to be at variance with the per-
ceived congressional intent to provide a broadly applied remedial 
statute. The two most recent cases just decided by the Supreme 
Court indicate that HUD has not shifted its position regarding the 
applicability of URA to persons displaced through mortgage foreclo-
sure. The D.C. Circuit's decision in Cole v. Harris,1I7 in rejecting the 
Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Alexander v. HUn,118 was the first 
indication that the federal judiciary was prepared to dispute the 
HUD-proposed interpretation of the Act. At this point, detailed 
examination of the fact patterns and issues raised in both cases will 
provide a thorough understanding of the contemporary problem. 
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 
A. Alexander v. HUn and Harris v. Cole: A Statement of .Facts 
and Issues 
The petitioners in Alexander v. HUnll9 were former tenants of the 
Riverhouse complex located in Indianapolis, Indiana. The project 
was originally constructed by a private, non-profit corporation, Riv-
erhouse Apartments, Inc., which also was the original mortgagor. 
This corporation financed the complex through a mortgage insured 
and subsidized by HUD.120 In 1970, Riverhouse Apartments, Inc. 
defaulted on the loan. The mortgagee (Government National Mort-
gage Association) assigned the mortgage to HUD in return for the 
'14 [d. 
115 See Section II (A), supra. 
"' See Section II (B), supra. 
117 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
118 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
II. [d. As we turn to the analysis of Alexander and Cole it is necessary to keep in mind the 
potential significance of these cases. The federal government has become one of the largest 
owners of inner city property through this type of default in the mortgage insurance program 
(Caramico v. HUn, 509 F.2d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 1974)). A finding in favor of the tenants 
potentially will extend the Act's benefits to a large category of heretofore ineligible persons, 
and consequently require HUD to expend many unanticipated dollars. 
'29 This mortgage insurance was secured under § 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act as 
amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1715(L)(d) (1976). Upon completion of Riverhouse, the interest rate 
was reduced to 3 percent and the mortgage was purchased by the Government National 
Mortgage Association. 
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proceeds of the mortgage insurance. For the next three years HUD 
chose to work with the owner in an attempt to cure the default, but 
such efforts proved unsuccessful. Faced with the continuing default, 
HUD initiated a foreclosure action in the United States District 
Court. 121 In June, 1974, a foreclosure decree was entered ordering 
that Riverhouse be sold and the proceeds be applied to the balance 
due on the mortgage. 122 HUD purchased the property itself at the 
court ordered sale. 
HUD employed a management firm to operate and manage River-
house while the agency evaluated the future of the complex in light 
of the general condition of the property and the needs of the sur-
rounding low- and moderate-income community. The project had 
fallen into deplorable condition. Feeling that the unsafe conditions 
were a threat to health and safety and that the costs of bringing the 
building into a safe and decent condition were tremendous, HUD 
decided to close the project and evict the tenants. 123 Notices to quit 
were served on all the tenants,124 and by February, 1975 Riverhouse 
was vacant. No relocation assistance whatsoever had been provided 
for the tenants. The Riverhouse tenants sought relocation benefits 
as provided for by URA, asserting that the order to vacate River-
house made them eligible as "displaced persons" within the mean-
ing of the Act. The District Court held that URA was not applicable 
to this category of tenants and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 125 
The plaintiffs in Harris v. Cole 126 were former tenants of Sky 
Tower, a multi-family housing project in Washington, D.C. com-
pleted in the 1950's. In 1970, the Housing Development Corporation 
121 Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166, 167 (7th Cir. 1977), aiI'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
122 [d. 
123 HUD did have alternative avenues of approach under 12 U.S.C. § 1713(L). There the 
department is granted authority to renovate and modernize the property as well as to rehabili-
tate and sell it to a private developer or public housing authority. 
12. The letters ordering the tenants to vacate read as follows: 
We regret to inform you that we have been advised by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, that due to the unsafe conditions of the buildings, it has become 
necessary to close Riverhouse Towers Apartments. 
All residents must vacate the premises by December 31, 1974. 
We are sorry for any inconveniences; if we can be of any assistance to you in relocating, 
please feel free to call our office, telephone 635-3371. 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. Federal Property Management Corpora-
tion. 
Reprinted in Petitioners Brief for Writ of Certiorari, App. at 8, Alexander v. HUD, 47 
U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
125 Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), aiI'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
'" 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), reu'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
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(HDC)127 purchased the complex and secured a mortgage insured by 
HUD under Section 236 of the National Housing Act,12H The intent 
of the sponsor, HDC, was to rehabilitate Sky Tower into a complex 
of larger apartments to serve low- and moderate-income families. 12u 
HUD agreed to provide three branches of financial support - the 
initial mortgage, a subsidized interest rate on the mortgage and rent 
supplement payments to sixty households. 130 
The original contractor for the rehabilitation defaulted in early 
1972. A second contractor was retained by HDC after HUD was 
asked to increase its mortgage insurance commitment to cover in-
creased costs. Later in 1972 this second contractor stopped work 
with rehabilitation only partially completed. HUD exercised its 
rights under the mortgage insurance contract by foreclosing this 
mortgage. The agency acquired title to Sky Tower through the fore-
closure sale in 1973. HDC had urged HUD to maintain the insurance 
subsidy and rent supplements while it acted as its own contractor. 
HUD refused to do so on the basis that the cost overrun would 
increase rents to such a level that the project could not be success-
fully operated pursuant to Section 236 of the National Housing 
Act. 131 In effect, HUD had "insisted that the property be fore-
closed"132 even though another option was available. 
HUD hired a management firm to operate Sky Tower and new 
month to month leases were executed with the tenants. At the same 
time HUD began to study alternatives relating to the diposition of 
the property. In 1974, the agency, having rejected further rehabilita-
tion as futile, decided to demolish Sky Tower and sell the land to 
developers for the construction of single family homes. Pursuant to 
this decision, the management firm sent notices to the tenants in-
forming them of HUD's decision. The tenants were given thirty days 
notice to vacate the premises. 133 HUD determined that these tenants 
were not displaced persons within the purview of URA.134 Although 
.27 HDC was a non-profit corporation formed in 1965 to promote the development of' hous-
ing for low income families in the District of Columbia. HDC formed a non-profit subsidiary 
corporation, Anacostia No. One, Inc., to act as the formal holder of title. Brief for Respon-
dents at 3, Harris v. Cole, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
128 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(j) (1976) . 
• 20 Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979) . 
• '" [d.; see 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976) . 
• 3. See Brief for Respondents at 6, Harris v. Cole, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
132 389 F. Supp. 99, 101 (D.D.C. 1975) . 
• 33 Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979) . 
• 34 [d. 
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the agency did provide some relocation assistance, such aid was 
considerably less than what was available under the Act. 135 
The District Court held that the Sky Tower residents were, in 
fact, displaced persons and eligible for the benefits provided by 
URA. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 136 
This examination of the fact patterns of Alexander and Cole com-
pels the conclusion that these two cases are remarkably similar in 
nature. An attempt to distinguish these cases would have been folly. 
Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that either the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit incorrectly decided the Alexander case l37 or 
the divided District of Columbia Circuit Court l38 overstepped the 
bounds of URA in the Cole decision. The Supreme Court recognized 
the similarities between Alexander and Cole, consolidated the two 
cases for hearing, and concluded that the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit had incorrectly interpreted the Act. 
B. United States Supreme Court Decision 
The Court's examination of the language of the Act and the legis-
lative history led it to conclude that the original congressional in-
tent was to provide relocation assistance only when property was 
acquired for federal programs. Congress did not intend to extend 
benefits beyond that very limited acquisition context to cover all 
displaced persons. Therefore, the Court found that Section 101(6) 
and the written order clause were of limited scope. The latter was 
designed only to insure benefits to those people ordered to vacate 
because of a proposed acquisition that was never consumated. 
The essence of the decision was that the written order clause 
contains two causal requirements. First, the written vacate orders 
must result directly from an actual or proposed acquisition. Second, 
the acquisition itself and not only the written orders must be "for" 
'35 Cole v. Lynn, 389 F. Supp. 99 (D.D.C. 1975). HUD provided some assistance including 
$300 in moving expenses to certain departing tenants. However, it did not comply fully with 
Title II of URA. 
13. Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
137 Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979); see 
Moorer v. HUD, 561 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1977); Davison v. HUD, 428 F. Supp. 328 (N.D. Ga. 
1976); Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974) for other decisions in accord with 
Alexander v. HUD. 
138 Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). The D.C. 
Circuit did not reach a unanimous decision in Cole v. Harris. Judge Wilkey authored a 
lengthy and comprehensive dissent which is a fine analysis in support of the position taken 
by HUD. [d. at 601. 
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a federal program or project. Thus, no benefits are available if the 
agency, at the time of acquisition, did not intend to use the property 
for a program or project. A later developed disposition program will 
not meet the causality requirements. In neither of the two cases did 
the Court find a sufficient relationship between the HUD acquisi-
tions and the subsequent orders to vacate to bring the tenants 
within the purview of the Act. 13o 
Unfortunately, the Court's analysis did not include any consider-
ation of the broad overview of the Act and its general humanitarian 
purpose. Nor was there any consideration of the impact of its narrow 
construction on the Act itself or the people who would be affected. 
Rather, the Justices felt constrained by some very limited language 
of previous unenacted versions of the Act. Seemingly, a classic ex-
ample of form over substance. 
C. The Issues 
The tenants in each of the cases before the Court sought benefits 
under the second branch of the Section 101(6) definition of dis-
placed person. 140 When broken down into simple requirements it is 
apparent that in order for a tenant to meet the statutory language 
of "displaced person" he must (1) move, (2) as a result of a written 
order to vacate, (3) given by the acquiring agency, and (4) the 
written order to vacate must be for a program or project undertaken 
by a federal agency or with federal financial assistance. 
There is little dispute that the first two criteria were met by the 
tenants in both cases. The lower courts and litigants seemingly 
agreed that (1) the notices sent to the tenants constituted "[tJhe 
written order of the acquiring agency to vacate real property"; and 
(2) the tenants moved from the property as a result of these orders. 
Four issues were in dispute before the Supreme Court. The first, 
which was initially raised in Cole v. Harris, questions whether HUD 
actually was an "acquiring agency" by having come into possession 
through the mortgage defaults. 14l The question was raised in connec-
tion with the timing of the written orders to vacate: HUD contended 
that it was not an "acquiring agency" within the meaning of the 
statute since the written orders to vacate are issued at some time 
I3S Alexander v. HUD, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
140 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976). 
141 The government raised this issue for the first time in this case. Generally courts have 
searched for existence of a federal program or project and have not found it necessary to 
address the question of whether HUD was an "acquiring agency." 
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subsequent to acquisition rather than contemporaneously with or 
prior to the acquisition. This was one of the issues upon which the 
Court based its decision. 
The next two issues before the Court related to the fourth criteria 
of the definition of "displaced persons," that is, the requirement 
that the orders to vacate pursuant to the acquisition be for a 
"program or project" within the contemplation of URA. The first of 
these issues raised was whether URA contemplates "program or 
project" to inClude all government acquisitions or only those found 
to be "voluntary." The Court made only passing reference to this 
issue in its decision. The second issue was whether URA requires 
only that the written orders to vacate be for a federal program or 
project or whether the original acquisition also must be for such a 
purpose. The Court did see this question as having import in the 
ultimate decision. The final and most basic issue before the Court 
was whether a mortgage foreclosure is a program or project within 
the meaning of URA. Unfortunately, the Court did not examine this 
issue in depth. Such an examination became unnecessary when the 
Court found Section 101(6) to require a written order be issued 
pursuant to an acquisition and that a mortgage default acquisition 
would not satisfy the causality requirements of the provision. 
Prior to an analysis of these' issues it should be noted that the 
Court, in framing these issues, correctly recognized that in neither 
of the two cases did the tenants claim coverage under the 
"acquisition" clause of Section 101(6). The tenants eligibility 
turned solely on the meaning of the 101(6) definition's "written 
order clause." Specifically, the Court saw that eligibility depended 
upon the interpretation of two elements in the statutory definition 
- "acquiring agency" and "for a program or project."142 
1. Timing of Written Orders To Vacate 
The Supreme Court decided that a determination as to whether 
URA requires that the written orders to vacate be issued contempor-
aneously with a presently occurring acquisition or prior to an antici-
pated acquisition was an important factor in the case. The govern-
ment maintained that in order for a person to be displaced it is 
necessary that the written order be issued in connection with an 
acquisition or an anticipated acquisition.143 In other words, HUD 
'42 Alexander v. HUD, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369, 4371 (1979). 
'43 Petitioners Brieffor Writ of Certiorari at 7,8, Harris v. Cole, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
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contended that the phrase "acquiring agency" in Section 101(6) 
should be read as "to denote an agency that is engaged in or propos-
ing to engage in an acquisition."144 The tenants contended that the 
proper reading of "acquiring agency" includes an agency that has 
acquired the property at any time in the past. 
Judge Wilkey, dissenting in Cole, agreed with HUD and inti-
mated that the written orders to vacate must be issued in conjunc-
tion with the actual acquisition and that the "acquiring agency" 
requirement is not met in situations where the government already 
owns the property, as in the two cases before the Court.U5 The con-
tention is that the written order clause is to be read conjunctively 
with the acquisition clause, leading to the result that the written 
order to vacate must be connected to the original acquisition. 146 In 
fact, the argument goes so far as to intimate that the written order 
must precede the acquisition. 147 The Supreme Court framed the 
issue in much the same way. The conflict was a definitional one 
between the tenants and HUD. Does "acquiring agency" simply 
denote a governmental body that has previously acquired property 
and that eventually orders persons to vacate, as contended by the 
tenants? Or, is "acquiring agency" only a shorthand description of 
an agency currently engaged in the process of acquiring property? 
The latter HUD interpretation contains an implicit acquisition re-
quirement. Thus, under this construction, the written order clause 
would not apply unless an agency's proposed acquisition of property 
directly causes issuance of the orders to vacate. The tenants' inter-
pretation demands no immediate causal connection between the 
procurement of property and the order to vacate. 148 
The Court relied heavily on the very early versions of Section 
101(6) to support its conclusion that only persons dislocated by 
actual or proposed acquisitions, and in particular, those acquisi-
tions intended to further federal programs, were to be included in 
the Act's coverage.149 The Court interpreted bits of very specific 
legislative history to indicate that the written order clause was an 
addition designed only to delineate more precisely a subcategory of 
the originally intended beneficiaries-those who move in anticipa-
... [d. at 12 . 
... Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
". Petitioners Brief for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Harris v. Cole, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
'47 Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
". 47 U.S.L.W. 4369, 4371 (1979) . 
... [d. at 4373. 
488 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 7:463 
tion that a property acquisition for a federal program will require 
their displacement. l60 The Court found the clause refers only to 
the very narrow situation where planned, but unconsummated ac-
quisitions of property for federal programs result in displacement. 151 
There was no discussion of how such a narrow interpretation would 
affect the values and broad policies underlying the concept of re-
location assistance. 
The result of the Court's reasoning is that a written order to 
vacate would not by itself set URA in motion, even if it were deter-
mined to be for a federal program or project. An acquisition prior 
to or contemporaneous with the written order would be required. 
This is exactly the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court to deny 
the tenants in Cole relocation benefits. 
Nothing in the language of the written order clause suggests such 
an interpretation. ls2 The statute clearly states that one is displaced 
if one moves "as a result of the acquisition" or "as the result. of the 
written order of the acquiring agency."153 The words "acquiring 
agency" seem to contemplate, in fact, that an acquisition will have 
already taken place. One must question how a "written order" could 
ever be issued by an acquiring agency prior to an acquisition. Such 
an order can only come from the entity that has legal authority to 
order evictions, i.e. the owner. 
The construction, propounded by HUn and accepted by both 
Judge Wilkey and the Supreme Court, that excludes persons who 
are displaced by a written order occurring subsequent to the acquisi-
tion of their homes finds little support either in the language of the 
Act or in the broad legislative intent of the Act as previously exam-
ined. The very earliest relocation assistance statutes, which Con-
gress considered inadequate, did not limit benefits to acquisition 
situations but covered persons displaced by "any form of govern-
ment action" including "the closing or vacating of dwellings by 
public officials. "154 Senator Percy summarized the intentions of 
Congress in enacting URA: "We must insure that anyone who loses 
.$0 The Court relied heavily upon the proposed Fair CompensatioA Act of 1964, a very early 
precursor of URA, as the basis for most of the current provisions codified in the Relocation 
Act. In addition to this proposed relocation l;Jill, the Court turned to early but unenacted 
versions of Section 101(6) to reinforce its conclusion concerning the limited scope of the 
written order clause . 
••• 47 U.S.L.W. 4369, 4374 . 
• 52 See 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976) . 
• 53 [d . 
• 54 S. REP. No. 1472, S3d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1954). 
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property or a home as a result of a public project receives fair com-
pensation under a uniform set of procedures .... "155 
In light of the legislative history and underlying purpose of the 
Act one can easily envision a broad interpretation of "displaced 
persons" that includes those who receive notification of eviction 
both prior to and subsequent to the acquisition. The House Report 
carries this construction one step further, stating that "if a person 
moves as the result of such notice to vacate, it makes no difference 
whether or not the real property is actually acquired."156 Thus, the 
government's contention that the written order must be issued in 
connection with an acquisition finds little convincing support either 
in the statutory language or the legislative history and should have 
been rejected by the Court. 
2. Issue of Voluntary or Involuntary Acquisition 
The issue relating to the characterization of a mortgage foreclo-
sure as either voluntary or involuntary initially surfaced in the Sec-
ond Circuit's opinion in Caramico v. HUD.157 This line of reasoning 
received further judicial support when the Seventh Circuit adopted 
basically the same approach,158 reading the statute as stating that 
only "voluntary" acquisitions satisfy the Act. Thus, according to 
the Second and Seventh Circuits, involuntary acquisitions cannot 
qualify as a program or project within the meaning of URA. 
The lower courts found a crucial difference between mortgage 
insurance acquisitions and acquisitions under programs originally 
contemplated by URA. The former were characterized as "random 
and involuntary while normal urban renewal contemplates a con-
scious government decision to dislocate some so that an entire area 
may benefit."159 Acquisitions by such involuntary and random 
'05 Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 57-58 (emphasis added). 
15fi H.R. REP. No. 91-1656, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970). 
157 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974). 
158 Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1977), aiI'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
The tenants in Alexander have incorrectly sought to distinguish Caramico on the grounds that 
it construed the "acquisition clause" while they were relying on the "written order clause". 
They further argued that in Caramico HUD was not the mortgagee, did not foreclose on the 
mortgage, nor did the agency eventually purchase the property. 
The Seventh Circuit properly rejected the idea that the two cases were distinguishable: 
"[Allthough distinguishable with respect to particular facts, Caramico involved the same 
inquiry as presented by this case, i.e., whether the activity of the governmental agency was 
for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance." 
[d. at 169. 
'" Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1977), aiI'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979), 
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means rather than by conscious government decision were held not 
to be for a federal "program or project." In other words, acquisitions 
that precede the order to vacate must be characterized as voluntary 
on the part of the acquiring agency before any tenant can invoke the 
provisions of URA. 
Judge Wilkey, in his lengthy dissent in Harris v. Cole,160 also 
adopts the view that the taking of title by HUD was an involuntary 
acquisition in response to a defaulted mortgage. He accepts HUD's 
contention that the acquisition must be made as a voluntary and 
conscious choice, stating: "[B]oth clauses contemplate a voluntary 
acquisition. . . . [T]he acquisition here, by default and foreclo-
sure of an insured mortgage, should be considered involuntary 
"181 
Judge Wilkey also cited the Second Circuit's reading of the 
"program" definition as "contemplating normal government ac-
quisitions, which are the result of conscious decisions to build a 
highway here or a housing project or hospital there."162 He argued 
in accord with the Second and Seventh Circuits that acquisitions 
due to defaults and foreclosures, being involuntary and random, 
were not for a "program or project. "183 
The Supreme Court summarily dismissed this analysis in a foot-
note, by stating that to focus on the "voluntariness oversimplifies 
application of the statute .... [V]oluntariness is relevant only to 
the extent it is probative of the agency's overall purpose in procuring 
property."I" The Court's decision finds ample support in the word-
ing and history of the Act. However, the Court's outright rejection 
of the question without any analysis in the text of the opinion is 
disappointing as it tends to minimize the import of the decision and 
fails to quell future questions concerning the basis for its decision. 
The "voluntary" acquisition requirement argued by the govern-
ment was simply being read into the statute. The existence of such 
citing Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 1974) . 
... Though we are basically concerned with the conflict between the majority position of 
the Seventh Circuit as espoused in Alexander v. HUD and that of the Second Circuit in Cole 
v. Harris, Judge Wilkey's dissent is often referred to for an extrapolation of the pertinent 
issues. His lengthy and well-written dissent is a complete and detailed examination of' the 
issues whereas the court in Alexander did not proceed in such depth. 
II. Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (referring to 
42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976)) . 
• IZ Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) . 
• " Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
"' 47 U.S.L.W. 4369, 4376 nA3 (1979). 
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a requirement is not apparent from the plain language of the Act. 
There is no mention in URA of this crucial difference between vol-
untary and involuntary acquisitions. In fact, neither the word vol-
untary nor involuntary even appear in the statute, nor is there even 
a suggestion that such an inquiry be made. If this was the result 
Congress sought to achieve, the definition of displaced person would 
more appropriately be: one who moves from real property as the 
result of the conscious or voluntary acquisition of real property. 
Such a definition, however, was not adopted. To the contrary, the 
long legislative historyla5 of URA indicates that Congress was pri-
marily concerned with the effects of displacement on persons who 
were financially and socially unable to meet the hardships imposed 
by government acquisitions. The degree of hardship suffered by 
these people does not seem to have any relation whatsoever to the 
government's state of mind at the time of acquisition. 186 The Act is 
a uniform act intended to be equitably and uniformly applied. 167 
There seems to be no justifiable reason why a tenant displaced by 
an involuntary government acquisition should be treated differently 
than a tenant displaced by a voluntary acquisition. 
Even if the Court had accepted the proposition that an acquisi-
tion must be voluntary before URA is applicable, there is evidence 
that the acquisition of both Riverhouse and Sky Tower can comfort-
ably fit within this requirement. HUD acquired Sky Tower after a 
conscious decision that it would not allow the developer (HDC) to 
act as its own contractor because the project could not be run suc-
cessfully as a Section 236 project. la8 District Court Judge Gesell 
found that HUD "insisted that the property be foreclosed."169 Fur-
ther, the "written orders" to vacate that resulted in displacement 
18. See Section II(B), supra . 
... The broad humanitarian concern that Congress had can be seen from an example that 
received emphasis early in the deliberations. The situation involved a family which lived 
adjacent to a town that had been acquired by the U.S. Army in order to build a dam. The 
family was forced to move in that they had relied upon the town for all services even though 
the Army neither needed nor acquired their property. The House Judiciary Committee re-
ported favorably on a special bill to provide this family relief. The House, in its Study of 
Compensation, supra note 38, at 124-26, discussed this particular situation showing great 
concern about the inequity to the displaced family and no concern whatsoever that the 
acquisition would be involuntary or unnecessary or an unanticipated consequence of a pre-
vious voluntary project. Simple justice required providing assistance to the displaced family. 
Brief for Petitioners at 22, n.28, Alexander v. HUD, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976) . 
... See National Housing Act § 236, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976). 
'10 Cole v. Lynn, 389 F. Supp. 99, 101 (D.D.C. 1975). 
492 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LVol. 7:463 
were not issued for more than twelve months after HUD's acquisi-
tion of title. The project was run by a management firm during 
which time HUD undertook studies to determine the ultimate dis-
position of the property. Only after these studies were completed did 
HUD decide to pursue the demolition and sale alternative. This 
hardly seems like an involuntary acquisition or involuntary dis-
placement of persons. At either point HUD had at least one other 
option which would have prevented the eventual displacement.171t 
The Riverhouse project presents a similar pattern. HUD acquired 
title to this project also pursuant to the National Housing Act, 
albeit a different provision than above. The pertinent section171 
empowers the agency to foreclose on a defaulting mortgagor and to 
purchase the property at public sale. However, it does not mandate 
that the agency pursue this option. 
The Secretary at any sale under foreclosure may in his discretion. . . 
bid any sum up to but not in excess of the total unpaid indebtedness 
secured by the mortgage, plus taxes, insurance, foreclosure costs, fees, 
and other expenses, and may become the purchaser of property at such 
sale. 172 
During the three year period from July 1970, when the note and 
mortgage were assigned to HUD in return for the insurance pro-
ceeds, HUD allowed the owner to operate the property rather than 
to foreclose or seek a court-appointed receiver. It was not until 1973 
that HUD decided to foreclose and then voluntarily purchased the 
property at the foreclosure sale. 
In the government's Reply Memorandum for Petitioners in the 
Cole case, HUD virtually acknowledges the voluntary nature of the 
Riverhouse acquisition. Comparing the acquisition of Riverhouse to 
the acquisition of Sky Tower in Cole, the government stated: 
[T]he Department obtained title to the project by bringing its own 
foreclosure action in the face of the mortgagor's continuing default. 
Since the Department had the option of refraining from foreclosure and 
continuing to suffer the mortgagor's default, the acquisition could be 
considered "voluntary" in the same sense that respondents [Cole ten-
170 "HUD concluded that five alternative disposition plans were available, four involving 
variations on continuing the rehabilitation and the sixth requiring demolition for the develop-
ment of single family homes. The demolition alternative was selected." Brief for Respondents 
at 7, Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
171 National Housing Act § 207K, 12 U.S.C. § 1713(K)(1976) (emphasis added). 
172 [d. (emphasis added). 
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ants] contend the acquisition of Sky Tower was "voluntary." Indeed, 
since the Department acquired title to the project in Alexander through 
its own action rather than automatically in response to action by the 
mortgagee, the acquisition in Alexander could be said to be even more 
"voluntary" than the acquisition in the present case. 173 
Thus, there seems to be little statutory justification for requiring 
that the acquisition be characterized as "voluntary" before benefits 
might become available and the Court was correct in dismissing the 
issue. Even if the "voluntary" nature had been required, the evi-
dence is strong enough to indicate that the acquisitions in the in-
stant cases met this requirement. 
3. Issue of Acquisition Being Made for a Federal Program 
The final issue to be resolved prior to the central inquiry regarding 
the federal program or project requirement is whether the statute 
requires that the agency's acquisition of the property, and not sim-
ply the orders to vacate, be made for the purpose of a "project 
undertaken by a federal agency." HUD contends that the acquisi-
tion, as well as the written orders, must be for a federal program or 
project. 
Even if the demolition were considered such a program or project, or 
even if the demolition anticipates a further program or project, that is 
not sufficient to trigger the statute unless the agency's acquisition of the 
property - not simply its order to vacate - was made for that pur-
pose. 174 
The government claimed that the D.C. Circuit in Cole gave too 
broad a construction to the phrase "for a program or project under-
taken by a federal agency," and that the phrase should refer back 
singly to the "acquisition clause. "175 Again, the Supreme Court re-
lied heavily on the very early versions of portions of the Act to 
support the government's claim. The Court placed emphasis on the 
fact that since "acquisitions of property" seemed to be the key 
element to eligibility in these early pieces of legislative history, it 
was important to remain consistent with this approach. The Court's 
decision was that the acquisition must be for or intended to further 
a federal program or project. A program developed after the agency 
173 See Brieffor Petitioners at 24, Alexander v. HUD, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979) (citing Reply 
Memorandum for Petitioners at 3, Harris v. Cole, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979». 
17. Petitioner Brieffor Writ of Certiorari at 14-15, Harris v. Cole, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
175 Id. 
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procures property and causes displacement will not trigger benefits 
since the program could not have motivated the property acquisi-
tion. 17s The Court apparently adopts HUD's position that the lan-
guage "for a program or project" refers to the agency's original 
purpose in acquiring property, not just its purpose in issuing an 
order to vacate. The written order clause is to apply only if an 
agency issues its notice to vacate pursuant to an actual or proposed 
acquisition of property intended to further a federal program.177 
Thus persons such as the tenants in Alexander and Cole, are ineligi-
ble to obtain relocation assistance unless the agency also intended 
at the time of acquisition to use the property for a federal program 
or project. 
The difficulty of determining an agency's subjective intent is ob-
vious. In practical terms requiring applicants for URA benefits to 
carry this burden of proof will insulate the agency from any assis-
tance responsibility. Past agency practices have shown the inclina-
tion to avoid these financial responsibilities and to now require proof 
of subjective intent defeats the purpose of the statute-to aid those 
who cannot shoulder the burden of displacement alone. 
Further, the more natural reading, adopted by the D.C. Circuit,17X 
is to have the phrase refer both to the word "acquisition" and the 
term "written order." The two clauses are disjoint requirements. 
Whether the original acquisition was for a federal program or project 
is not material as long as the written order is pursuant to such a 
program. Further support for this interpretation is found in a ruling 
by the Comptroller General stating that the time to determine 
whether Relocation Act services are available is when the tenants 
are evicted, not when the acquisition occurred. 17u 
In the maze of semantic and legal technicalities surrounding each 
issue it is easy to lose sight of the purpose of relocation assistance. 
As one examines each issue it is important to remember the con-
gressional intent underlying the Act. Congress was concerned with 
the harsh human effects of governmental programs that result in 
population displacement. The primary interest sought to be ad-
dressed by URA was congressional concern for the displacees. Any 
technical interpretation, similar to that presented here, that re-
duces the intended impact of the Act by refusing benefits to vulner-
'" 47 U.S.L.W. 4369, 4376 n.43 (1979). 
177 [d. at 4372. 
17' Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
'10 52 Compo Gen. 300, 304 (Nov. 28, 1972). 
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able displacees, must be examined with a jaundiced eye. 
The only remaining issue of import is whether or not there exists 
a federal program or project. It is this final point that was the crux 
of the cases before the Court and upon which the decision ultimately 
should have rested. 
4. Can Mortgage Foreclosure be Characterized as a Federal 
Program or Project? 
The Court was faced with resolving the basic controverted ques-
tion of whether foreclosure and subsequent disposition by HUD is 
to be considered a program "undertaken by a federal agency or with 
federal financial assistance." Congress chose not to explicitly define 
the terms "program" or "project" in the Act. 180 Nor does the legisla-
tive history "illuminate Congress' intent with respect to those 
terms."181 Since there is judicial precedent that statutory language 
should be read as it is understood in common usage,182 attention 
must be paid to the everyday connotation of the words. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines "project" as "something proposed for 
execution; a plan, scheme, purpose, a proposal" and "program" as 
"a definite plan or scheme of any intended proceedings; an outline 
or abstract of something to be done. "183 
There are four basic approaches that can be adopted in order to 
reach a determination of this broad but crucial interpretive ques-
tion. Each line of reasoning was addressed by the litigants in their 
briefs to the Supreme Courtl84 and each appears worthy of analysis. 
The first approach is to interpret "program or project" as requiring 
some construction of new structures or rehabilitation of existing 
ones. The second approach would define "program or project" as 
any plan that would further or accomplish a program designed to 
benefit the public as a whole. This approach results in a tautology 
that defines the elusive "program or project" as a "program or pro-
ject." The third approach is to classify the original mortgage insur-
ance program that eventually led to the acquisition as a federal 
180 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976). The lack of attention to the definition of these words in the 
general provisions of the Act is evidence of the choice not to specifically define program or 
project. 
181 Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1977), a/I'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
182 See NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 324-25 (1951). 
183 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2319-2320 (1971). 
184 Brieffor Petitioners, Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), a/I'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 
4369 (1979); Brief for Respondents, Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 
U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
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"program or project." Finally, the Property Disposition Program, 
developed by HUD, can also be classified as a distinct federal pro-
gram. 
Anyone of these issues could, and probably should, have been the 
primary basis for the Court's decision. However, the Court chose to 
give only limited attention to these most critical inquiries. Finding, 
its legislative history analysis of the Section 101(6) written order 
clause basically dispositive of the cases, the Court provided an ex-
tremely limited analysis of these other issues. 
As to the first issue of whether actual construction might be re-
quired, the Court chose not to engage in any discussion or analysis; 
the issue was completely ignored. The Court's treatment of the sec-
ond issue consisted of a single statement recognizing that Congress, 
by requiring that an acquisition be for a federal program or project, 
intended that the acquisition must further or accomplish a program 
designed to benefit the public as a whole,185 The Court provided a 
bit more discussion regarding the third issue of whether the original 
mortgage insurance program was a distinct program within the pur-
view of the Act. Relying on its prior analysis of legislative history, 
but without any significant explanation, the Court held that "the 
mere anticipation and authorization of default acquisitions in the 
mortgage insurance programs cannot trigger the benefits of the 
Act. "188 Furthermore, it stated that even should the mortgage insur-
ance programs constitute federal programs or projects, the causality 
requirements of Section 101(6) would not be satisfied. In the cases 
before the Court the acquisitions occurred as a result of predictable 
failures and consequently did not further the basic purpose of these 
particular programs. 187 . 
The treatment of HUD's Property Disposition Program, which 
sets out procedures for disposing of property acquired by the agency, 
was similarly lacking in-depth analysis. The Court did recognize 
and admit that the Disposition Program was in fact a Section 101(6) 
"federal program or project." However, such a finding was not 
enough to bring the tenants within URA. Since HUD did not 
acquire the properties specifically to further the Disposition Pro-
gram, the causality requirement was not met. The Court reasoned 
that the statute required more than a casual connection between the 
'85 Alexander v. HUD, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369, 4376 (1979). 
'88 Id. 
18' Id. 
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orders to vacate and the demolition program. The program or pro-
ject must also be the reason for acquiring the property,188 
Though given limited attention by the Court, each of these posi-
tions is set forth here to provide the reader with the same set of 
questions that was faced by the Supreme Court. The author posits 
that taken together there was ample reason to reach an opinion 
contrary to that of the Court. 
a. The Requirement of Construction 
The government suggested that a "program" or "project" refers 
only to a "federal construction or rehabilitation project, such as 
public works or urban renewal,"188 and not to the mere elimination 
of a presently existing home or apartment complex. This contention 
has been accepted in varying degrees over the years. The require-
ment has been interpreted to refer to construction of new federal 
projects. 180 The Second Circuit also intimated that since there are a 
number of references within URA to construction activities, Con-
gress intended the program requirement to mean construction pro-
grams. 191 The Alexander court, though not directly relying on this 
proposition, did make reference to decisions construing this addi-
tional "construction" requirement. 182 
The language of the statute shows no indication that such a re-
quirement was intended. No mention is made of the word 
"construction" nor is there any language that could be interpreted 
to suggest such a limitation. No doubt there exist isolated bits of 
statutory language that make reference to "construction." In fact 
the 2d Circuit in Caramico drew attention to Section 4626 of URA 
which makes reference to "actual construction."193 However, no 
mention is made of the fact that the context in which these words 
appear bears no relationship to the eligibility requirements of Sec-
tion 101(6). The reference is made in the section that permits the 
head of the appropriate federal agency to take action in providing 
replacement housing if the lack of same has kept the project from 
18. [d. 
'89 Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
". See Jones v. HUD, 390 F. Supp. 579, 583 (E.D. La. 1974). 
'" Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 1974). 
'" Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1977), aII'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979) 
citing Jones V. HUD, 390 F. Supp. 579, 583 (E.D. La. 1974); Caramico V. HUD, 509 F.2d 694, 
698 (2d Cir. 1974). 
"3 Caramico V. HUD, 509 F.2d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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proceeding to actual construction. To draw such an important re-
striction from isolated and out of context references would do dam-
age to the broad intent of the Act. 
The tenants in Cole and Alexander maintained that an accept-
ance of this requirement by the Supreme Court would lead to an 
interpretation of URA not possibly intended by Congress. IU4 The 
limitation would result in demolition of the property being consi-
dered a program or project only when the acquiring agency con-
structs a building in its place. When the agency simply tears down 
a project without rebuilding there would be no "program or project" 
within URA, thereby relieving the agency of their financial responsi-
bilities vis a vis relocation benefits. The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit recognized this anomaly stating: 
HUD's mandate is to increase the stock of decent, sanitary housing 
for low-income families-not to destroy existing housing. Congress 
clearly did not intend that tenants displaced by a simple decision to 
wreck their homes would receive less protection than tenants displaced 
by a constructive urban renewal project. IU5 
b. The Requirement of Public Benefit 
The court in Alexander, though making reference to the above 
line of reasoning, proceeded directly to a consideration of Section 
201, the Declaration of Policy provision of URA. 
The purpose of this subchapter is to establish a uniform policy for the 
fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced as a result of federal 
and federally assisted programs in order that such persons shall not 
suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the 
benefit of the public as a whole,196 
The court saw the last phrase as controlling by defining a 
"program" as an activity that would, at least in design, benefit the 
public as a whole. The abandonment of the Riverhouse project and 
the coterminous order to quit was not characterized "as a program 
or project designed to benefit the public as a whole." Closure of the 
project was viewed as nothing more than an admission that the 
original project, designed to provide the poor with adequate hous-
ing, was an irretrievable failure. The court reasoned that the mere 
... See generally Brief for Petitioners, Alexander v. HUD, 47 U.S.L.W. 4:l69 (1979); Brief 
for Respondents at 28, Harris v. Cole, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979) . 
.. 5 Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976) (emphasis added). 
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decision to terminate a project could not possibly become a new 
project, absent at least some indication that the order to quit was a 
prelude to some government activity designed for the public's bene-
fit.1U7 
The court in Cole also addressed to some degree the issue of 
whether the abandonment and subsequent demolition of a housing 
project is properly characterized as a program designed to accom-
plish an objective that would benefit the public as a whole. The 
district court found that HUD issued the written order to vacate in 
order to demolish the buildings so that blight could be eliminated 
and middle-income homes built on the site in accordance with a 
master plan for the area. IUS The court did not reach the question of 
whether programs or projects by definition required some new con-
struction, only that in the Cole case such a plan for construction 
certainly did qualify as such a program. 
At the time Sky Tower was demolished there was a master plan 199 
for the local area that contemplated the construction of single fam-
ily homes on the cleared site. Such a proposed plan did not exist in 
Alexander. Consequently, the Supreme Court was faced with the 
comparison between a demolition in anticipation of a subsequent 
building program and a demolition without any subsequent pro-
gram planned. A better approach would be to characterize both 
demolitions as efforts to eliminate blight caused by vandalized, un-
safe and unattractive housing projects. Clearly, such a demolition 
project would be for the benefit of the public as a whole in urban 
areas that need revitalization. Further, the original policy underly-
ing the Act reveals no indication that a plan for subsequent con-
struction is required to trigger the benefits. Such a plan could con-
stitute a program but its absence is irrelevant. If relocation benefits 
were withheld in these instances, the displaced tenants would be 
forced to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of a project 
designefl for the benefit of the general public. This would be in clear 
contradiction to the intent of the Act. 200 
c. Mortgage Insurance as a Distinct Program 
As we have seen, the courts have focused much attention on the 
'" Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166, 170 (7th Cir. 1977), aii'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
IO. Cole v. Hills, 396 F. Supp. 1235, 1236 (D.D.C. 1975). 
'" See text at notes 133-34, supra. 
200 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976). See text at notes 49-77, supra. 
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problem of whether a federal program or project exists in a particu-
lar case. Generally, they have looked to the time period following 
the original acquisition. The history of URA does not indicate that 
such a restrictive approach to "program or project" should be taken. 
In fact, the broad intent of the Act would seem to mandate that 
"program or project" be read in its broadest sense. 
In their preoccupation with the search for a post-acquisition 
"program" or "project," the courts have overlooked an obvious posi-
tion. The history of government mortgage insurance indicates that 
the acquisition, itself, was made pursuant to a federal program. 
Mortgage defaults and subsequent purchases of the property by 
HUD can be said to be a fully expected and consciously planned for 
result of a federal program.201 
The government first became involved with this type of mortgage 
insurance in 1968 when Section 236202 was added to the National 
Housing Act of 1934.203 In order to stimulate the development of 
housing for low-income families, Section 236 was designed to attract 
private mortgage funds into the low-income housing market. 204 HUD 
was authorized to pay interest subsidies in order to reduce the mort-
gagor's annual interest rate to 1 % and also to insure mortgage loans 
that were made to developers in the low-income market. 205 The in-
terest subsidy payments obviously would require an annual appro-
priation of federal funds. Congress, apparently recognizing that the 
receipt of insurance premiums would not provide sufficient funding 
for the insurance program, authorized appropriations for a Special 
Risk Insurance Fund.208 The anticipation was that the insurance 
program would absorb excessive costs resulting in a net loss to the 
program.207 The Special Fund was to cover these losses. The House 
Report stated that substantial assistance would be provided by the 
new programs and such aid was worth the anticipated costs. 20X The 
Senate Report is even more to the point on this issue: 
[T]he bill would establish, ... a "Special Risk Insurance Fund" 
which would not be intended to be actuarially sound and out of which 
"" Brief for Respondent at 30, Harris v. Cole, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
202 Section 236 was part of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 
90-448,82 Stat. 476,498; 12 U.S.C. § 17152-1 (1976). 
203 National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (as amended). 
"14 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976). 
205 Id. 
"10 Id. at § 1715z-3. 
207 Id. 
20K H.R. REP. No. 1785, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1968). 
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claims would be paid on mortgages insured under the new lsectionJ 
.. 236. 
* * * 
[T]he fund would be authorized to cover any losses sustained by the 
fund in carrying out the mortgage insurance obligations of these pro-
grams ... [I]t is intended that the Secretary be able to obtain appro-
priations to cover anticipated or projected losses as well as actual losses 
in order to provide adequate operating funds during the long period 
required to liquidate properties. 209 
The mortgage default acquisitions by HUD in these cases can 
hardly be properly characterized as not being for a federal program 
or project when in fact they were expressly anticipated and funds 
were appropriated to cover the costs of the program.210 
d. Property Disposition as a Distinct Program or Project 
The search for post-acquisition programs has further led the 
courts past a realistic interpretation that could satisfy the intent of 
Congress. HUD's Property Disposition Program that eventually re-
sults in demolition is, of itself, a "program" within the meaning of 
URA.211 This Disposition Program is statutorily based in Section 
207(L) of the National Housing Act. 212 That provision grants HUD 
wide discretion in the acquisition and disposition of properties that 
have been insured and subsidized under the various NHA pro-
grams.213 HUD is authorized through the Secretary "to complete, 
reconstruct, rent, renovate, modernize, insure, make contracts for 
the management of . . . , or sell for cash or credit or lease in his 
discretion, any property acquired by him under this section 
.... "214 The policies, procedures and regulations adopted by HUD 
to deal with foreclosed properties such as Sky Tower and River-
200 S. REP. No. 1123, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1968) (emphasis added). 
210 The Riverhouse project in Alexander v. HUD was financed by a mortgage insured and 
subsidized by HUD through a similar government program, found in Section 221(d)(3) of the 
National Housing Act as amended. 12 U.S.C. § 1715(d)(3) (1976). Riverhouse was constructed 
to provide decent housing for low income persons and, ironically, in particular, those who had 
been displaced by governmental action. 
211 See Brief for Petitioners at 29, Alexander v. HUD, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
212 12 U.S.C. § 1713(L) (1976). 
213 [d. 
21. [d. HUD developed a "disposition program" pursuant to this mandate. See generally 
U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HUD PROPERTY HANDBOOK-MuLTI-FAMILY 
PROPERTIES, RHM 4315.1 (1971). 
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house prior to acquisition,215 during ownership,216 as well as during 
disposition217 are all clearly detailed in HUD procedures. 
Prior to the final disposition of the two properties at issue, HUD 
undertook studies to evaluate the best use of the property in accord-
ance with the Property Disposition Program procedures.2IH In both 
instances management firms were hired to operate the property 
pending the outcome of the studies, and in both instances HUD 
eventually determined that it was in the government's best interest 
to close down the projects.219 
Recently HUD has developed a new Property Disposition Pro-
gram220 which presently governs such acquisitions. The new program 
draws from and expands upon the prior program's considerations 
and policies.221 The regulations222 indicate that the disposition pro-
gram is a complex plan to be developed through the analysis of any 
number of factors223 and is designed to accomplish results that will 
provide benefits to the public as a whole. 224 HUD's Property Disposi-
tion Program requires the department to assess a number of social 
and economic factors;225 to make a difficult decision on whether to 
continue to operate the project or abandon the purposes for which 
it was built;228 to decide whether or not to rehabilitate the property227 
and to set forth the procedures for sale once that decision is 
reached. 228 Certainly such extensive procedures and plans constitute 
a "program" within the commonly understood meaning of that 
term. 229 
'" [d. ch. 3, at 7-15. 
m [d. ch. 4, at 27-42; ch. 6, 7, at 56-72. 
217 [d. ch. 3, § 1, at 7. 
m [d. 
'" See Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979); 
Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4369 (1979). 
220 24 C.F.R. 290 (1978). 
221 Brief for Petitioners at 32, Alexander v. HUD, No. 77-874 (S. Ct. argued Dec. 5,1978). 
222 24 C.F.R. 290 (1978). 
223 24 C.F.R. §§ 290.10, 290.20, 290.30, 290.40 (1978). 
224 24 C.F.R. § 290.10 (1978). 
225 [d. § 290.30. 
22. [d. § 290.10. 
227 [d. § 290.30. 
228 [d. 
'" Brief for Petitioners at 33, Alexander v. HUD, No. 77-874, (S. Ct. argued Dec. 5,1978). 
The new Property Disposition Program, 24 C.F.R. Part 290 under which Riverhouse was 
sold, even more dramatically demonstrates the benefits which accrue to the public once 
HUD obtains ownership of the property. That program pursues the public policy of provid-
ing decent housing and a suitable living environment for all Americans in accordance with 
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The Mortgage Insurance Program and the Property Disposition 
Program seem to comfortably fulfill the program or project require-
ment of Section 101(6) of URA.230 This was explicitly recognized by 
the Court with respect to the Disposition Program, and implicitly 
recognized with respect to the Insurance Program. Unfortunately, 
the causality requirement demanded by the Court precluded relief 
for the tenants of Riverside and Sky Tower. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A number of sources have been examined in order to reach an 
understanding of URA, its basic purpose and its scope. The specific 
provisions of the Act indicate just what is at stake financially for 
"displaced persons," the majority of whom are socially and econom-
ically disadvantaged. The broad legislative history of URA provides 
strong support for the proposition that Congress intended the Act 
to be a humanitarian and remedial statute that was to have broad 
application. Yet, with the exception of the D.C. Circuit in Cole v. 
Harris the judiciary, now with the approval of the Supreme Court, 
has chosen to narrowly, and at times torturously, construe the provi-
sions of the Act. Benefits have been denied to that class of persons 
whom Congress sought to aid. A broad interpretation and applica-
tion of the Act as originally intended by Congress is more appropri-
ate. 
Each and every American has the right to be housed in a decent, 
safe and sanitary dwelling. This right should not be denied by HUD, 
the agency charged under the law with ensuring just such a result. 
HUD has argued forcefully that the cost factor of extending URA 
to the limits urged by the tenants is prohibitive. This position ig-
nores the basic fact that the tenants in Alexander and Cole are 
members of that class of persons whom Congress sought to aid origi-
nally. Providing relocation benefits to this category of displaced 
persons would not be an extension or broadening of URA but only 
its proper application. Secondly, if the standard for relocation assis-
tance is that the public as a whole shall not benefit at the expense 
42 U.S.C. § 1441a; and because of that program, HUn may no longer dispose of property 
without consideration for the policies underlying the National Housing Act. Rather, it 
must exercise its powers with the express purpose of preserving housing for low to moder-
ate income persons at rents which they can afford, while at the same time protecting the 
financial interests of the government. 
[d. at 35. 
230 See Section III(c), supra. 
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of any other segment of the population, then the public should be 
required to bear its full share of the costs of relocation. The burden 
should not fall on those least able to pay. 
Human values are at the heart of the URA. We must consider in 
our analysis the extreme human costs to those displaced. The de-
moralizing social and psychological consequences of loss of home, 
neighborhood, friends and community are not and cannot ever be 
provided for. , 
The Court has chosen to interpret the Act's benefits with a narrow 
vision. The impact of dislocation on an individual is the same re-
gardless of the intent of an agency when it originally acquired the 
property. It is now incumbent upon Congress to expand the scope 
of the Act by clear language incapable of being narrowly construed. 
